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PAKISTAN NEXUS IS 
ONE OF THE MOST 
SIGNIFICANT SOUTH 
ASIAN FLASH POINTS 
T he Afghanisla1I-l'akislan nexus is onc of the mOSl significant SOUlh Asian 
f1ashpoims, This bi];ncml rela-
tionship wi!1 have an immense 
imll(lCI on fllture Iloliliea] and 
socio -a-onOIII ie d L,\ '(' Jop mel) IS 
in the region ~md beyond. 
Despite the fact, that both 
countries share multiple com-
monalilics in culture, religion 
<unl civi[i~tioll. their bilateral 
relations have always been 
tense and antagonistic under 
all gm"CnU llclllS: cspt.'Cially due 
10 specific historical circum-
stances. Although sume 
improvements have been 
achic\"cd in the past. the life-
span of these positive devcl -
opmcllIs was never long 
enough tosubsI3ntiaUychange 
the aninldes the countries have 
towards each other. Dc€p mis-
trust, suspicion, resemmem 
and binemess between Kabl~ 
and Islamabad have remained 
oonstallf anributes of this polit-
ical deadlock. This is surpris-
ing because Pakistan claims 
that its major imerest -since 
independence - is 10 work 
towards a unified, peaceful and 
friendly Afghanistan. 
It seems that this three- in-
one strategy, proclaimed by 
Islamabad as the cornerstones 
of its Afghan policy, has been 
eroded by oompeting interests. 
poor implememation and 
mLLlual misperception. Instead 
of openingan avenue towards 
friendly and constmcti\lC coop-
c ration, thc two neighbours 
have been blaming cach othcr 
for decadcs of in tcrfering ht 
their rcspt'Cti\lC intenlal <lff<lirs, 
IHlll1pering social, economic 
and political de\'clopll1ent, 
Afghanistan is ~lcctlSing its east-
e rn neighhour of sllpponing 
militant appositional forces in 
order to destabiJize incon\lCn-
ient govcrnmellls. In contrast. 
rakistan is blaming Kabul of 
reinforcing insurgencies in ils 
resource rich border province 
Ilalllchistan as well as being 
responsible for the deteriora -
tion ofthe security simat ion in 
WaYjristan. These fears in par-
ticL~ar. are gaining momennlm, 
beC,IUse Pnkiswni securi ty cir-
ces nre cOlwinced thnt 
Afglmnistan is hosting intelli -
genceofi ts arch riwllndia. Not 
only la i 111 prove their own ca 1>11 -
biJitics in this direcTion bUI ~llso 
10 be able to Cilrry out activities 
on rakistani territory. 
TIle fact, that noneofthe sev-
eral regimes in Afghanistan has 
ever recognized the legitimacy 
of the British imposed Durand 
Uneasan imernational border 
between the TWO cOLlntries fur-
ther complicates the bilaternl 
relationship. Territorial claims 
to the Pash!un and Baluch 
regions of rakistan arc just 
another face! of the Afghan dis-
pure \,~th Islmna1mrl which can 
be traced back to colollinl 
times. 'l1lesc issues lmvc deTer-
mined thedevc101)IIICnT ofthc 
AfglHlnistan- l~dkis!(on rt'lil1ions, 
which cml broadly be ca tego-
rized into tWO periods: First , the 
war o f resistance against the 
Soviet occupation. the rise of 
the Taliban. and the subsequent 
intergroup Afghan ch 'il war 
with the Nonhern Alliance and 
Other Mili!ant Forces (OMF). 
Second. the pos!-Taliban pol i-
!icsand the ongoinginsurgen-
cies in Afghanistan. In ho!h 
phases, there is no douh! that 
Pakisfan plnyed and is still play-
ing a nmjor role in Afghanistan's 
political devclopment; con-
st<llllly incrensing invol\'ellletll 
• 
in the OOU11I r)"5 intenml (LffHirs. 
Basically onc can STale. tha t 
l'llk iswn's foreign policy out-
look lmd behavior on the inter-
nlltional stage is guided by its 
search for security alld power 
in an as hos tile, insecure and 
highly COI11I)etitive perceived 
environulent. 
Howcver, onc also has 10 
emphasizc tilat it "115 nOI only 
l'akistan's anxiety uf a sct'tlnd . 
WI:stem front at t1w Afglmn bur, 
der which could leild to an 
encirclement by '11indu lndiu' 
tlmt motivated the decision-
makers in Islaummut to in ter-
\'Cne in Afgh~nisllm. p·.tkismn·s 
Afghan policy o\'er the lasl 
decades is not merely influ · 
enced byextemnl factors. The 
influence of domestic consid· 
erations should not be side-
lined. In times of weak nnd 
unstable civilian as well as mil-
itary governance, Afghanistan 
was regarded as a welcome 
issue. Focusing on Afghanistan 
was often used ns a strategic 
tool, shifting The attention of 
internal and external critics 
towards its neighbour state. 
Today il seem s quite obvious 
{hat the anemp{s to use the 
Afghan policy as an instnullent 
not o nly against New Delhi bm 
also within i{Sown political the· 
atre inlslamabad backfired. 
Today. India's engagement in 
Afghanistan as well as the pos-
itive perception among Afgl1.1ns 
{awards New Delhi is at a his · 
{Oricallleak. 
seE PAGE 26 
FROM PAGE 25 
In contrast, mistm st aimcd at 
Pakistan is conWlIuly increas-
ing, creating a worSt case scc-
nario fo r r'akis tan's politicnl 
s tra tegists, Subsequcntly onc 
ml15t statc that lslamahad 's aim 
to establish a Pakistan- friendly 
Afghan government has failed, 
Pa ki stanis have to re-evaluate 
the importance and core ele-
ments ofthe trinity of its Afghan 
policy, especially its interpreta-
tion of a 'friendly Afghanistan', 
Friend ly should at leastlllean 
cooperative, but it does not 
i111 ply subservience as SOl nc hard 
linc~ among the polilical clill'S 
viCw it. In this comext the vi~'w 
of AfghaniStan as the 'little broth-
er' and/or a ' j>akistani outpost' 
in a greater strategic game has 
to be abandoned. I'urlhcrmore, 
l'akistan's policy to ca l}itali~.e on 
the frictions among diffe rent 
Mghan groups heavily under-
mined its no tion of creaTing a 
unificdAfghanistan and lead to 
a 1);"tmdox sitU<uion: On onesido, 
a major aim oflslamabad was 10 
I)romote consensus and unity: 
on the other sidc, its activi ties 
" 'ere pert;cil'ed as the greatest 
sources for instabili ty in 
Afghanistan. Havingthis in mind 
it is not surprising. that the cur-
II!nt government in K.1hul i5col1 -
ccrnl-d that Pakistan continues 
10 identify the 'I)tliban or other 
militant groups as a 'strategic 
asset' 10 maintain its innuence 
in the country, espt.'Cia lly after 
the withdrawal offorcil,'11tfOOpS. 
11tcc1aim made by IIrolrtgOllists 
or thisargument is that Pakistan 
,,111 ulili7,t the deeply fragment-
ed and anarchical slme of Afghan 
sociely 10 undermine any peace 
process which could lead to an 
unravorable s ituation for 
Islamabad. However, taking the 
currem po litical condit ions imo 
accoullt. it would bc nail'c to 
think that Afghan sccurityforccs 
will dCI'Clop the capabilities nec-
essa ry at lcast not in the early 
20 14 pos t-withdrawal scenario, 
to stabilize the security si tu.1lion 
as well as maintain lal" and 
o rder. Despite remarkable 
progress, the pcrmanent set-
backs like whole units dl'Scning 
a lld /or dcfct1i11g, the infiltration 
of terroris ts among thei r own 
nmk-:md-fi[es etc., the govern-
[llCnt will conti llue to rely 0 11 
robllstmil ita ry support frol11 
outside, not only including hard-
ware but also fo rcign mili ta ry 
manpower. 
Until now Pakistan's military 
and SCCllrity estab lishment does 
not want to allow India or any 
o lhe r regional ac to r to fill a 
p,nwer vaCUU Ill in Afghanistan. 
!'akistan's hawkish observers 
would intorprot incrcasing 
Indian involvement in 
Afghaniswn as a di rect threa t 
which would consequently lead 
to a deterioration of Indo-Pal:: as 
well as M-rak re lations. BUI as 
recent high level bilateral talks 
hetween Afghanistan alld 
Pakistan indicatc, it seems that 
differenCl'S betW\.'C1l the civilian 
1,'OI'CnJltle l11 and the military and 
the ISl aTe be(:oming more evi-
dent in ls!:nnabad. '11lis is most 
interesting to notc, since the 
innucnce of Pakistani security 
scctorfoTtTh on tllccoulllry-s for-
eign policy dt'Cision making is 
identified by IlIany ana lys ts as 
respons ible for t he complexity 
of and a deadlock in the bilater-
al relations of both coulllrics. An 
empowerment of civilians in 
Pakistan's Afghan pol icy could 
pll!pare the ground for a new and 
perhaps much bronder dialO!;l1C 
including «onomic and tmde 
relawd issues. Taking the increas-
ing international pressure into 
account. the current cil'man I,'OV-
ernment is trying to step outside 
the box ofitsoldMghanistan pol-
ifics, thl~~ searching for an ·exit 
strategy, But the lates t failed 
attempts 10 gain lslamabad's 
SUPllO rt fo r convi llcing the 
'I;Llibmlto take part in the Mghml 
peace and rt'l.'Ondliatioll prut"CSS 
Sl'CtnS to prow that a consensus 
bctwccn the civilian and mili-
tary government in Pakistan is 
far from being reached. Even 
though , a new wave of realist ic 
mId pragmatic re-thinking has 
reached I he Jl;1kistmli (m ilit~ L ry) 
leaders and stmtegic thinkers, 
lat elll di s trust and hostility 
be tween the main poli tical 
forces in l'akistan are still well 
alive , especially between the 
Supreme Coun, the GOl'cnunent 
and the Armed Forces. 
Nevcrlhek'SS, the probability of 
po litical changc in Islamabad 
has nCI'!;!r bo.."'Cn higher titan now. 
A windowof opportunity which 
could lead to the Strengthen ing 
of civil society and the political 
system, which would allow a 
more TObust stance TOwards the 
ever so powerful mili tary. 
TIlmugh this process Pakistan 
might hc able 10 overcome his-
torical paradigms, such as its 
hos tile relationship towards 
lndb, This process is sll pportl'(l 
by an itKTCasing a\\~lreneSS, that 
in the cnd, thc whole involve-
melll in Afghanistan provcd to 
be a ntl'SSY affairfor l'akistan, its 
support for the Mujahideen 
against the Red Amlyor for the 
Taliban or any other group in 
Afghanistan during the civil war 
never actually produced sati s-
fyillS outcomes. The contrary 
occurred. Ins tead of gaini ng 
influence in Afghanis tan 
!~dkistan had to sm lggle in order 
10 m aintain control over vas t 
arcas in its border regions. 
TIlCrdorc, the current debalCS 
circling around l'Otcmial 
Isln lllabad suppOrt for Ihe 
Afghan Taliban andlor t he like-
lihood of K.1bul"s assistance for 
the Pakistani Taliban are stand-
ing in thc way of a Sllstainable 
rapprochement be tween 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. One 
thing should hc blatantly clear 
to political ohsclVers: there will 
no peace in Afghanistan with -
out a substantia! in(1)TOI'CllIelll 
o f l ~d ki stan-Afgha nist:ltl rcl~, ­
tions. 
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